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INTRODUCTION

Several states have established a duty on the part of psychotherapists to protect the public from harm caused by their dangerous paI am grateful to my colleagues at the University of Nebraska College of Law and
Department of Psychology who commented on an earlier presentation of these
ideas at a faculty colloquium. David Wexler provided helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this Article, although I reluctantly refrained from altering the
title as he suggested. Thanks also to Dennis Moynihan who provided capable
research assistance. Mike Quattrocchi provided detailed responses to an earlier
draft of this Article, but he said he was tired of appearing in my footnotes, so I
won't mention him this time.
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tients.1 The Supreme Court of California initially articulated this
duty in the widely discussed Tarasoff case where the court stated:
When a therapist determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession
should determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended
victim against such danger. This discharge of this duty may require the therapist.., to warn the intended victim or others... to notify police, or to take
whatever other steps are reasonably necessary .... 2

Recent cases have sought an appropriate standard by which to
measure this duty. Some courts have adopted a standard which holds
that the duty attaches only when the patient makes specific threats
toward identifiable victims (STIV).3 The two most recent major decisions, however, have applied the zone of danger (ZOD) test. According to this standard, the duty applies whenever the patient poses a
foreseeable danger and it extends to all victims in the zone of danger.
These courts have explicitly rejected the STIV standard on the basis of
legal theory and policy analysis.4 While these two lines of cases differ
in that the former endorses the STIV standard while the latter applies
the ZOD test, they agree insofar as all accept the underlying duty of
therapists to protect the public from their patients.
This Article will assume for the sake of argument that the Tarasoff
duty applies and that some duty to protect third parties is justified. It
will examine the rationales for the STIV and ZOD standards as provided by the recent court opinions, and it will argue that: (1) Schuster
and Hamman both misconstrue the question as a choice between
STIV and ZOD as alternative standards for the same Tarasoff duty,
(2) rather than competing tests for the same purpose, these two standards address two different duties that have developed from the
Tarasoff line of cases, (3) under certain circumstances, both the STIV
and the ZOD standards might appropriately apply, (4) evaluation of
the STIV standard turns primarily on empirical premises that cannot
be resolved by appeal to legal theory or policy analysis alone; contrary
to the recent court opinions, the ZOD and STIV standards share a
common foundation in legal theory and policy, 5 and (5) both the
1. S. J. BRAmmE, J. PARRY & B. A. WE'E, THE l.ENTALLY DIsABLED AND THE LAW
582-89 (3d ed. 1985).
2. Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 431, 551 P.2d 334, 340, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20 (1976).
3. E.g., Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333 (D. Colo. 1983), aff'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th
Cir. 1984); Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal.
Rptr. 70 (1980).
4. E.g., Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 775 P.2d 1122 (1989); Schuster
v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 424 N.W.2d 159 (1988).
5. One who prefers to think of empirical premises as part of policy analysis can
rephrase the claim in the following manner. Policy analysis, on this understanding, includes both normative evaluation of policy priorities and the relevant empirical premises. In these terms, the ZOD courts have erroneously evaluated the
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courts and the relevant professions should construe their respective
responsibilities regarding these issues differently than they have in
the past.
Although this Article relies heavily on clarification of the concepts
and arguments involved in several court opinions, the conclusions
carry prescriptive as well as conceptual significance. In this manner,
this Article pursues the agenda of therapeutic jurisprudence, an approach to mental health law that encourages legal actors to formulate
substantive and procedural law and to fulfill their legal roles in a manner designed to promote the therapeutic mission of the mental health
system insofar as doing so is consistent with the normative principles
underlying the law.6 The fifth claim listed above endorses a revised
legal analysis by the courts and a research agenda for professional organizations, both of which are intended to improve the practical effects of tort-regulation of psychotherapy.
The argument will proceed in the following manner. Part II will
analyze the two most recent major cases-Schuster and Hamman.
Part III will examine previous cases in order to identify the legal principles and factual circumstances that courts found compelling in selecting standards in those situations. Part IV will clarify two
important underlying conceptual issues and advance alternative analyses both of the appropriate role of the two standards and of the relevant policy considerations and empirical premises that support these
standards. Part V will summarize the arguments and conclusions of
the Article.

II. SCHUSTER and HAMMIAN
A.

Schuster v. Altenberg

The therapist's outpatient was involved in an automobile accident
while driving, killing herself and seriously injuring her daughter who
was one of the plaintiffs. The patient's family sued the therapist, alleging that he causally contributed to the accident through negligent
diagnosis and treatment, as well as through negligent failure to protect others either by warning the family of the patient's condition and
STIV standard as an issue of legal theory and normative policy analysis, when it
is more accurately understood as a matter for empirical policy analysis.
6. D. WEXLER, THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE: THE LAW AS A THERAPEUTIC AGENT
(1990); Wexler, InducingTherapeutic Compliance Through the CriminalLaw, 14
L. & PSYCHOLOGY REV. 43 (1990); Wexler & Schopp, How and hen to Correct
for JurorHindsightBias in Mental Health MalpracticeLitigation:Some Preliminary Observations, 7 BEHAVIORAL Sci. & L. 485 (1989) [hereinafter JurorHindsight Bias]; Schopp & Wexler, Shooting Yourself in the Foot with Due Care:
Psychotherapistsand Crystallized Standardsof Tort Liability, 17 J. PSYCHIATRY
& L. 163 (1989) [hereinafter Crystallized Standardsof Tort Liability].
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7
its implications or by seeking civil commitment.
The issue of concern to this Article is the duty to warn or to protect
third parties. The trial court applied the STIV standard, holding there
was no duty to warn or protect third parties absent a readily identifiable victim.8 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin explicitly rejected the
STIV standard in favor of the ZOD standard on the basis of the legal
theory underlying Wisconsin tort law. The court reasoned that Wisconsin accepts the broader theory of duty advanced in the Palsgraf
dissent rather than the narrower conception of duty endorsed by the
Palsgrafmajority, and further, that this broad notion of duty precluded restrictive standards such as the STIV.9
The critical distinction between the STIV and ZOD tests involves
the type of evaluation the court applies in determining whether the
defendant had a duty toward the plaintiff. While the STIV standard
specifies a relatively clearly formulated criteria for attaching the duty
in this type of situation, the ZOD courts require a case by case retrospective analysis of the circumstances in each case. ZOD courts review the conduct of the defendant in light of the surrounding
circumstances and attribute a duty of reasonable care to that defendant if the situation was such that reasonable persons in the defendant's position would have foreseen the risks to other parties created by
their conduct. This duty extends to all potential plaintiffs within the
zone of danger. A person falls within the zone of danger if they are
foreseeably endangered by the defendant's conduct or if they are a
member of a category of persons foreseeably endangered.'o
Driving an automobile, for example, involves foreseeable risks to
other motorists and to pedestrians. Thus, drivers have a duty to operate their vehicles with reasonable care in light of the circumstances.

7. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 226-27, 424 N.W.2d 159, 160-61 (1988).
8. IM at 234, 424 N.W.2d at 164.
9. Id- at 234-40, 254, 424 N.W.2d at 164-66, 172. See generally Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928). The majority opinion in Palsgrafheld
that negligence concerns the relationship between the parties. The plaintiff can
recover from the defendant only if the defendant violated a right of the plaintiff
by creating an unreasonable risk of injury to that person. Id at 344, 162 N.E. at
100. Justice Cardozo also suggested that the interest harmed must be the same
interest that was foreseeably threatened by the negligence. Id. at 347, 162 N.E. at
101. Justice Andrew's dissent contended that the duty to avoid unreasonably
risky behavior was a duty to the world at large and, therefore, that one who engages in negligent conduct is liable for all injurious consequences of that action to
any injured party. Id at 350, 103 N.E. at 103. Both the majority and the dissent
agreed that defendants incur a duty when they act unreasonably by creating a
foreseeable risk of injury to another. They disagreed, however, as to the scope of
the duty.
10. Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 64, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (1989);
Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 233-40, 424 N.W.2d 159, 163-66 (1988); W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 169-73, 35659 (5th ed. 1984).
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This duty extends to all motorists and pedestrians in the zone of danger; that is, all those who would be endangered by the driver. If driver
Davis injured pedestrian Peterson by driving negligently, Davis incurred a duty of reasonable care when he engaged in the foreseeably
dangerous activity of driving a car, and he violated this duty by driving
negligently. Peterson was within the zone of danger by virtue of her
membership in the foreseeably endangered class of pedestrians regardless of whether Davis could have foreseen that Peterson would be
walking in the area.
According to Wisconsin negligence law, actors incur a duty whenever their acts or omissions cause foreseeable risks to others."'
Although the Schuster opinion is somewhat ambiguous about the
scope of this duty, it extends at least to all foreseeable injuries and
victims.12 The Schuster court analyzed the duty to warn and the duty
to initiate civil commitment together as two comparable means of pro-3
tecting the public from foreseeable injury by dangerous patients.1
Thus, the defendant in this case was negligent if a psychiatrist exercising due care would have foreseen that failing to warn or confine would
result in harm to someone. If harm is foreseeable in this sense, then
the defendant is liable to all those who fall within the zone of danger
and possibly to others as well.'4
According to the court, Wisconsin tort law precludes the STIV
standard because the basic principle holds that the actor is liable for
all foreseeable consequences of his act except as those consequences
are limited by policy factors.' 5 The court interpreted the STIV standard as precluding liability for some foreseeable harms by ruling out
those cases in which the harm was foreseeable, but the patient did not
articulate a threat toward an identifiable victim. The court concluded,
therefore, that once foreseeability raises the duty, the STIV standard
11. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 235-40, 424 N.W.2d 159, 164-66 (1988).
12. Compare id. at 235, 424 N.W.2d at 164 with id at 236, 424 N.W.2d at 164-65. The
court stated that a negligent defendant who has created unreasonable risk to

someone is liable for unforeseeable consequences of that negligent conduct and to
unforeseeable plaintiffs. The court also asserted, however, that the plaintiff is
liable for all foreseeable consequences except those that are precluded by policy
considerations. This latter claim seems to suggest that the defendant is not liable
for unforeseeable injuries. Thus, it is not clear whether the court holds that hability in Wisconsin extends to unforeseeable consequences of negligent conduct.

The Schuster court endorsed a standard at least as broad as the ZOD; that is, the
negligent defendant is liable at least for all foreseeable consequences of the negligent conduct and to all foreseeable plaintiffs - those in the zone of danger. Liability might also extend beyond those in the foreseeable zone of danger to
unforeseeable plaintiffs and consequences. This Article will treat Schuster as a
ZOD case because the court clearly rejected the STIV standard in favor of a case
by case evaluation of foreseeability under the circumstances.
13. Id. at 234, 424 N.W.2d at 163-64.
14. Id. at 240, 424 N.W.2d at 166.
15. Id. at 236-40, 424 N.W.2d at 164-66.
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cannot limit that duty and create an exemption from liability for forebecause the patient did not articulate a threat or
seeable harm merely
6
identify a victim.'
Finally, the court rejected the proposition that public policy arguments support limiting the duty to cases in which the STIV test applies. It rejected the contention that dangerousness is not foreseeable
by appealing to the Wisconsin civil commitment law which the court
understood as requiring predictions of dangerousness and by citing a
recent law review article in which the authors reported that a survey
demonstrates that clinicians believe they can predict dangerousness.17
The court rejected the requirement of a specific threat to an identifiable victim by reasoning that clinicians have the ability to prevent
harm to unidentifiable victims or to the general public by issuing
warnings to the patient's family or by initiating emergency detention
under the statute.1 8
Hamman v. County of Maricopa

B.

The plaintiffs brought their adult son to the admission ward of the
county hospital. The defendant psychiatrist refused admission to the
inpatient ward, prescribed medication, and sent the patient home with
the plaintiffs. The patient attacked his stepfather two days later. The
plaintiffs alleged that the defendant advised them that the patient was
harmless and that he negligently diagnosed and treated the patient,
resulting in injury to the plaintiffs. The lower court and the supreme
court agreed that if the defendant had negligently advised the plaintiffs that the patient was harmless, this would give rise to a cause of
action by the plaintiffs against the defendant. The issue of interest to
this Article is the negligent diagnosis and treatment claim and particularly whether the defendant owed a duty to the plaintiffs arising out of
that claim.19
The Arizona Court of Appeals applied the STIV standard and concluded that the defendant had no duty to the plaintiffs absent a specific threat.20 The Arizona Supreme Court reversed the court of
appeals, rejecting the STIV standard. In doing so, the supreme court
endorsed the duty to protect third parties as articulated by the
Tarasoff court, and it framed the issue in this case as one of selecting
the STIV or ZOD standard for this Tarasoff duty.2 1
The court rejected the STIV in favor of ZOD because it concluded
the plaintiffs were foreseeable victims despite the lack of a specific
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

I& at 238-40, 252-53 n.9, 424 N.W.2d at 165-66, 171-72 n.9.
Id. at 244-48, 424 N.W.2d at 168-70.
Id- at 254-56, 424 N.W.2d 172-73.
Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 59-61, 775 P.2d 1122, 1123-25 (1989).
I& at 60, 775 P.2d at 1124.
Id. at 62-64, 775 P.2d at 1126-28.
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threat. The court asserted the defendant was aware that the patient
was of a type ("schizophrenic-psychotic") prone to unexpected episodes of violence and that the plaintiffs were readily identifiable victims by virtue of their constant physical proximity to the patient. The
court concluded, therefore, that the defendant should have determined that the patient was dangerous and that the plaintiffs were
likely victims. Thus, the plaintiffs were foreseeable victims in the
zone of danger.22 The court apparently reasoned that these plaintiffs
were foreseeable victims, but the STIV test would exclude them.
Therefore, the STIV cannot constitute an appropriate measure of liability because it would relieve therapists of a duty to prevent foreseeable harm merely because the patient did not verbalize a specific
threat.23
C.

The Common Foundation of Schuster and Hamman

The Schuster and Hamman courts agreed that the therapist's duty
to protect potential victims from injury by dangerous patients arises
by virtue of foreseeability when the therapist determines or should
determine that the patient presents a danger. Both courts explicitly
rejected the STIV standard in favor of the ZOD test because they interpreted the STIV as a standard that would illegitimately preclude
liability for foreseeably harmful conduct merely because the patient
did not articulate a specific threat or because this particular plaintiff
was not an identifiable victim. Neither found the policy arguments for
limiting liability to those cases addressed by the STIV standard to be
persuasive.
A critic might advance the following obvious objection. Both cases
predicated liability on foreseeable harm, but the general inability of
clinicians to predict dangerous conduct refutes the contention that
either danger was foreseeable. A duty on the part of therapists to prevent foreseeable harm by dangerous patients is vacuous, according to
this objection, because dangerous conduct is not foreseeable. This has
been one of the basic objections to the Tarasoff duty in general and it
is quite plausible in both of these cases. The Hamman court provided
no basis for its claim that patients like the defendant are prone to violent episodes and particularly none that showed a propensity to violence that would justify emergency detention under the statute. The
Schuster court relied on very questionable arguments in concluding
dangerousness is foreseeable in principle.24 In addition, the concur22. Id. at 62-64, 775 P.2d at 1126-28.
23. Id. at 63-64, 775 P.2d 1127-28.
24. See infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text for a critique of the court's argument based in the civil commitment statute. The court also cited a recent law
review article which reported that clinicians who responded to a survey believed
they could predict dangerousness. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 248, 424
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ring opinion suggests that the claim of foreseeability in this particular
case is weak.25 However, if one accepts the contention that the duty
arises from foreseeability, the claim that dangerousness is generally
not predictable actually constitutes an objection to the existence of a
Tarasoffduty to protect the public rather than an objection to a particular standard. Having accepted by assumption that some Tarasoff
duty to protect applies, arguments that danger is never sufficiently
foreseeable to trigger the duty are eliminated by hypothesis for the
purpose of this Article.
In short, the Schuster and Hamman courts explicitly rejected the
STIV in favor of the ZOD. Both courts evaluated the STIV and ZOD
standards as alternative tests for the same purpose, and both rejected
the STIV because they concluded it would preclude liability for some
foreseeable injuries. Part III will review the earlier court opinions
that have developed these standards in order to demonstrate that the
Schuster and Hamman courts misconstrued the relationship between
the STIV and ZOD tests. This review of these cases demonstrates
that, contrary to Schuster and Hamman, one cannot select from between these standards on the basis of legal theory and policy analysis
because the two tests share a common foundation in theory and policy.
The two lines of cases that have generated the STIV and ZOD tests
reflect judicial responses to divergent factual circumstances and to differences in the manner in which the parties or the courts framed the
issues.
III.
A.

PREVIOUS CASES

STIV Cases

In Thompson v. County ofAlameda, the Supreme Court of California held that the duty to warn arises only when the patient specifically
threatens an identifiable victim. The holding was narrow, however,
because the case addressed the liability of a public body carrying out
the parole program pursuant to a legislative directive. Not only was
there a basis in policy for the release program, it was one with a speN.W.2d 159, 169-70 (1988)(citing Givelber, Bowers & Blitch, Tarasoff,Myth and
Reality: An EmpiricalStudy of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443
(1984)). This argument, however, suffers from two difficulties. First, the issue of
central concern is the clinician's actual ability to predict dangerousness, not what
they believe they can predict. Neither the court nor the article cited presented
any reason to believe that the survey responses reported by this article accurately
portray the abilities of the respondents. Second, reports of an unspecified ability
to predict do not address the concern that is central to tort law which must ask
whether a particular danger is foreseeable enough for a particular purpose. See
infra notes 71-77 and accompanying text for an account of this purpose-specific
nature of foreseeability in this area of discourse.
25. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 268-69, 424 N.W.2d 159, 178 (1988)(Steinmetz, J., concurring).
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cific legislative mandate.2 6
A parole program by its very nature involves release from custody,
eliminating the possibility of decreasing danger by seeking or retaining custodial control. Thus, the court specifically addressed a duty to
warn rather than a broad duty to protect. The court held that when a
public body is carrying out a legislatively mandated parole program,
the duty to warn arises only when there is a specific threat to an identifiable victim. 27
In Brady v. Hopper, the court ruled that the duty to protect third
parties depends upon the foreseeability of the risk and on whether
this foreseeable danger embraced this specific harm caused. The court
reasoned that the danger becomes foreseeable and the duty attaches
when the patient threatens an identifiable victim.2 The court emphasized the foreseeability of the harm and the identifiability of the victim. It adopted the specific threat requirement as a criteria of
foreseeability in order to avoid creating unpredictable liability.29
In Hasenei v. United States, the court held the therapist had no
duty to control a patient's conduct unless the relationship provided the
therapist with the ability to exert such control and, further, this ability only arises when the therapist can predict with reasonable certainty that the patient would cause harm.3 0 On this interpretation,
the duty arises from the ability to control, and foreseeability creates
that ability. Although the court discussed the therapist's inability to
control the patient's conduct,31 it also stated the psychiatrist who
predicts danger to an identifiable victim should take reasonable steps
to prevent harm.3 2 Presumably, the court would include in the category of "reasonable steps to prevent harm" certain actions such as
warnings which do not actually control the patient's conduct, but attempt to prevent injury that might result from that conduct.
This court addressed the identifiable victim requirement, but in
contrast to the Thompson and Brady courts, it did not discuss specific
threats. On this court's analysis, foreseeability--described as the abil26. Thompson v. County of Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 749-58, 614 P.2d 728, 732-38, 167
Cal. Rptr. 70, 74-80 (1980).
27. M at 758, 614 P.2d at 738, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 80. Of course, the defendants could
have retained custody of this particular individual and pursued the legislative
mandate by paroling other individuals. The court found the defendants immune
by statute regarding the release decision, however, addressing the duty to warn as
an independent issue.
28. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983), affl'd, 751 F.2d 329 (10th
Cir. 1984).
29. Id at 1338. See also Eckhardt v. Kirts, 179 Ill. App. 3d 863, 534 N.E.2d 1339 (2 Dist.
1989). This Article will not review the Eckhardt opinion separately because it
closely followed the Brady reasoning and holding.
30. Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1011-12 (D. Md. 1982).
31. I& at 1011.
32. Id at 1012 n.24.
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ity to predict with reasonable certainty-creates the ability to prevent
harm, and the ability to identify the potential victim constitutes one
element in this ability to predict with reasonable certainty.
In Hasenei, the plaintiff claimed the defendant had been negligent
in failing to hospitalize a patient who later caused an accident while
driving. Although the court included the identifiable victim factor in
its description of the duty,33 foreseeability of harm, rather than identifiability of the victim, seems to be the central issue regarding hospitalization. Warnings require some identifiable person to warn, but
preventive steps such as hospitalization that actually limit the conduct
of the patient do not require knowledge of the potential victim's
identity.
In short, this case did not directly address specific threats or the
duty to warn. The court emphasized the therapist's ability to control
the patient's conduct, foreseeability of harm, and identifiability of the
victim, with the last two factors apparently seen as necessary for the
first. It remains unclear whether the court distinguished the ability to
control from the ability to prevent harm or realized that the ability to
identify the potential victim carries different significance for the former than for the latter.
The court also emphasized the requirement of an identifiable victim in Leedy v. Hartnett.34 The court reasoned that in order to contain
the Tarasoff duty within workable limits, those in charge of dangerous
people must be able to know who to warn. The court reasoned that
when a particular victim can be identified, there is good reason to impose on the therapist a duty to warn, but such a duty does not apply in
cases such as this one where the plaintiffs were not identified or part
of an identifiable class.3 5
The plaintiffs claimed the hospital had a duty to warn them of the
assaultive tendencies of a patient discharged by the hospital. The hospital denied that it had a duty to warn, and the court addressed this
specific dispute regarding the duty to warn. Protective measures
other than warnings were not addressed in the case.3 6 The court emphasized the identifiability of the victim as the foundation for the
duty, but it did not require a specific threat. The court apparently considered identifiability to be necessary for an effective warning which
was the only method of harm prevention at issue.
The Supreme Court of Vermont issued an opinion in Peck v. Counseling Services of Addison County establishing a duty to prevent foreseeable harm to identifiable victims. 3
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

7

The trial court found the

Id at 1012 n.24.
Leedy v. Hartnett, 510 F. Supp. 1125 (M.D. Pa. 1981).
Id at 1130.
Id at 1127, 1130.
Peck v. Counseling Servs. of Addison County, 146 Vt. 61, 499 A.2d 422 (1985).
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defendant's failure to warn the plaintiffs constituted a breach of the
duty to protect them. In light of this finding at the trial court level
and the factual background, the supreme court discussed the defendant's duty in terms of warnings and considerations relevant to warnings, including the ability to predict, the identifiability of the victim,
and the duty of confidentiality.3 8 The court held that mental health
professionals have a duty to exercise reasonable care to protect third
parties when they know or should know that their patients pose a serious risk of danger to an identifiable victim.3 9 The court's reasoning
emphasized foreseeability of harm to an identifiable victim, but it did
not require a specific threat. While the holding articulated a general
duty to protect, the court's reasoning directly addressed a duty to
warn, and this focus of attention on warnings may explain the requirement of an identifiable victim.
In Williams v. Sun Valley Hospital, the court decided that
"[w]here there is no allegation of a threat or danger to a readily identifiable person, we... are unwilling to impose a blanket liability upon
all hospitals and therapists for the unpredictable conduct of their patients with a mental disorder." 40 The court predicated liability on "a
threat or danger"; it did not specifically require a threat. Again, the
court emphasized the predictability of the harm and the identifiability
of the victim. In this case, a voluntary patient left the hospital and
precipitated an accident in which the plaintiff was injured. The plaintiff sued the hospital for failing to adequately confine and supervise
the patient.4 ' The court concluded, however, that there was no duty
to confine without a valid commitment order and that there was no
allegation of failure to seek a commitment order. Finally, the court
found that there was no duty to warn absent a foreseeable harm to an
identifiable victim.42 Therefore, as the court framed the issues, the
only available harm-preventing method was warning, and foreseeability of harm to an identifiable victim was a necessary condition for protection through warning.
In Sellers v. United States, the court issued an opinion that resembled Williams insofar as it addressed the duties to warn and to confine
separately.43 The court held the defendants had no duty to confine
the patient who harmed the plaintiff because that patient had been on
voluntary status.44 The court also concluded the defendants had no
duty to warn the plaintiff because the victim was not one who was
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 65-68, 499 A.2d at 425-27.
I& at 68, 499 A.2d at 427.
Williams v. Sun Valley Hosp., 723 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987).
Id. at 784.
Id at 787.
Sellers v. United States, 870 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1989).
Id at 1104-05. It was not clear why the court concluded that the patient's voluntary status precluded a duty to confine through involuntary commitment. The
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foreseeably endangered by the patient who caused the harm. 45 The
court recognized a therapist's duty to protect third parties from dangerous patients, and it applied a rule limiting this duty to those who
are "readily identifiable as foreseeably endangered." 46 The court did
not require specific threats, nor did it consider this issue.
Several consistent trends manifest themselves in this series of earlier STIV cases. First, the specific threat played a secondary role if
any. Either this factor was not mentioned, or it was secondary to the
requirements of a foreseeable danger and an identifiable victim. Second, several cases involved circumstances such that warning was the
only available means of preventing harm, or the only method explicitly addressed by the courts' reasoning. 47 In these cases, identifiable
victims were seen as necessary to give the therapists the ability to deliver warnings. Only Brady cited Palsgrafand only Brady specified
that the danger created by the negligence had to embrace the specific
harm caused. 48 The Brady court, like the other STIV courts,
grounded the existence of a duty in the foreseeability of risk, but it
explicitly defined the scope of the duty by reference to the Palsgraf
majority opinion, limiting the duty to foreseeable victims and
49
consequences.
In summary, the STIV cases emphasized foreseeability of harm to
third parties as the necessary condition for the duty to protect. When
warning was specifically at issue because it was the only available or
contested mechanism, identifiability of the victim was necessary to
create the ability to effectively protect through this method. Specific
threats, if mentioned at all, were discussed by the courts as a criterion
of foreseeability.
B.

ZOD Cases

In Petersen v. State, the Supreme Court of Washington decided a
case in which the patient who injured the plaintiff made no specific
threat, and there was no basis on which the defendant could have
identified the plaintiff as a potential victim. The court held, however,
that the defendant had a duty to take precautions to protect anyone
who might foreseeably be endangered by the patient's mental disorder.o In this case, the therapist failed to petition the court for an eximportant point for this Article, however, is that this reasoning led the court to
treat the duty to warn separately.

45. Id. at 1103.
46. Id. at 1102 (quoting Davis v. Lhim,124 Mich. App. 291, 301, 335 N.W.2d 481, 487
(1983)).
47. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text regarding Thompson, Leedy, Peck,
Williams, and Sellers.
48. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo.1983).
49. See supra note 9 regarding the significance of the Palsgrafreference.
50. Petersen v. State, 100 Wash. 2d 421, 671 P.2d 230 (1983).
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tension of civil commitment despite evidence that the patient was
prone to engage in dangerous activities such as driving while under
the influence of drugs. Following release, the patient injured the
plaintiff during an automobile accident.5'
Warning was not an option because the allegedly foreseeable danger took the form of the propensity to engage in activities that endangered the public at large. Neither the plaintiff nor anyone else was an
identifiable victim of this activity, but extending commitment would
have provided an opportunity to prevent harm by controlling the patient's conduct.
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., like Petersen, involved circumstances in which the patient who injured the plaintiffs had made no
threats, and the plaintiffs were not identifiable victims until after the
injury occurred. 52 There was no opportunity to warn due to the lack
of a threat or identifiable victim. The alleged negligence involved failure to detain or initiate civil commitment. The court based the duty
on foreseeability in that it arose when the therapists knew or should
have known that the patient created an unreasonable risk of harm to
the plaintiffs or to a class of persons of which the plaintiffs were members.53 In this case, as in Petersen,the preventive method at issue was
confinement of the patient, so a specifically identifiable victim was not
a necessary condition for effectively carrying out the protective
measure.
Both Schuster and Hamman identified Jablonski v. United States
as a ZOD case rather than as a STIV case. 54 Certain characteristics of
the case, however, render it at least as similar to the STIV cases as it is
to the other identified ZOD cases. Although there were no specific
threats, the Jablonski court found that the therapists knew or should
have known that the patient was dangerous and that the victim was
identifiable as the likely target. 5 The therapists had opportunities to
warn the victim when they discussed the danger with her and suggested that she stay away from the patient.56 The district court found,
however, that these discussions did not constitute warnings that were
sufficiently specific under the circumstances.5 7 Thus, this case, like
the STIV cases, involved a court determination that the therapists
failed to adequately warn an identifiable victim of a foreseeable harm.
The ZOD cases, like the STIV cases, demonstrate certain consisId at 422-24, 671 P.2d at 234-35.
Lipari v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 497 F. Supp. 185, 194-95 (D. Neb. 1980).
Id- at 194-95.
Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1983). See respectively Schuster
v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 253, 424 N.W.2d 159, 172 (1988); Hamman v. County
of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 63, 775 P.2d 1122, 1127 (1989).
55. Jablonski v. United States, 712 F.2d 391, 398 (9th Cir. 1983).
56. Id. at 392-94.
57. Id at 398.
51.
52.
53.
54.
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tent patterns. First, all three of the early ZOD cases as well as
Schuster and Hamman based the duty to protect on foreseeability of
harm. While Schuster and Hamman rejected the STIV test as illegitimately limiting duty regarding foreseeable harm, the earlier ZOD
cases did not explicitly consider it. Only Jablonski directly addressed
the duty to warn and only it explicitly claimed that the victim was
identifiable. Insofar as it emphasized the duty to warn and the identifiability of the victim, however, it was as similar to the STIV cases as
it was to the other ZOD cases. With the exception of Jablonski, the
early ZOD cases addressed failure to admit, to seek civil commitment,
or to seek extension of confinement; that is, they addressed control
through custody.
In Perreirav. State,58 the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted the
ZOD standard specifically for cases involving custodial control. The
opinion explicitly separated outpatient cases from those involving involuntarily committed patients.5 9 The court recognized the two lines
of authority referred to here as STIV and ZOD, but it did not endorse
either as a general rule.6 0 Rather, it limited its holding and rationale
to the issue of a psychiatrist's liability for harm to a third party by an
involuntarily committed inpatient released by the psychiatrist. The
court held that in these narrow circumstances, the psychiatrist had a
duty to evaluate the danger presented by the patient and to exercise
the statutory authority to petition the court for extended confinement
in order to protect the public.6 ' By framing the issues in this manner,
the court recognized both the STIV and the ZOD precedents, but it did
not fall clearly into either category because it limited its ruling to a
narrow set of circumstances involving negligent discharge of committed patients.
C. Comparison of STIV Cases With Earlier ZOD Cases
All of the ZOD and STIV cases grounded the existence of a duty to
protect in the assertion that harm was foreseeable. Several STIV
cases involved situations in which warning was either the only harmpreventing method available or the only one contested.6 2 These cases
focused on the identifiable victim requirement as a necessary condition for the ability to effectively prevent harm through warnings.
With the exception of Jablonski, the early ZOD cases involved situations in which failure to take, retain, or exercise some variation of custodial control constituted the alleged negligence. These custodial
58. Perreira v. State, 768 P.2d 1198 (Colo. 1989).
59. Id- at 1209-15.

60. 1& at 1210.
61. Id at 1215-20.
62. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
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measures did not depend on the ability to identify likely victims, so
courts did not require identifiability.
Jablonski was the only putative ZOD case that involved failure to
warn, but arguably this case is at least as consistent with the STIV
cases as it is with the other ZOD cases. It grounded the duty in foreseeability of danger, but so did the STIV cases. It also emphasized the
identifiability of a specific victim as did the STIV cases. It did not require a specific threat, but neither did most of the STIV cases.
Brady was the only STIV case that emphasized the specific threat
clause of the STIV standard. It, however, agreed with the other STIV
cases and the ZOD cases that foreseeability was the key to the duty.
The Brady case stands apart from the ZOD cases and from the other
STIV cases as the only one that explicitly identified the specific threat
as a workable criterion of foreseeability for the general duty to protect
third parties.
In short, all cases in both categories grounded the general duty to
protect the public in the finding that the patient presented a foreseeable danger. Those cases that specifically addressed warnings as protective measures emphasized the identifiability of the victim, while
cases involving custodial control did not. Neither the ZOD cases nor
the majority of STIV cases emphasized specific threats. Only the
Brady court granted great weight to specific threats, and that court
apparently understood this requirement as a criterion of foreseeability
rather than as an alternative to it.
IV. ANALYSIS
A.

The Duty to Protect and the Duty to Warn

The Tarasoff court articulated a duty requiring psychotherapists
to take reasonable steps to protect the public from dangerous conduct
63
that they know or should know their patients will perform.
Although the court articulated a broad general duty to protect, a prudent therapist would understand the standard the court actually applied as one requiring warnings. The Tarasoff defendant took other
reasonable steps to protect the victim, including the court's suggested
64
one of notifying the police, yet was found liable for failure to warn.
In addition, the court addressed a duty to protect "the intended victim,"65

a "foreseeable victim,"66 or "any third person whom the doctor

knows to be threatened by the patient."6 7 This focus on identifiable
63. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
64. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,431-32,551 P.2d 334,340-41,131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 20-21 (1976).
65. I& at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
66. I& at 439, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
67. Id-at 437, 551 P.2d at 344, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (quoting Fleming & Maximor, The
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victims makes sense only if the required protective step is a warning.
That is, warnings require identifiable victims or a limited group of
people who comprise the highly probable victims to whom one can
direct the warning. Alternative protective steps involving either therapeutic intervention intended to prevent dangerous conduct by the patient or custodial control do not require knowledge of the potential
victim's identity.68

The series of ZOD and STIV cases that followed Tarasoff reflected
this relationship between warnings and identifiable victims. The
STIV cases examined above addressed allegedly negligent failure to
warn and emphasized the importance of identifiable victims, while the
ZOD cases addressed questions of custodial control and did not emphasize the identifiability of the victims. For these reasons, prudent
therapists will conclude that Tarasoffand the cases that followed have
established a crystallized duty to warn, but not only a duty to warn.69
The relevant case law should lead reasonable clinicians to expect that
if their patients harm another and the courts decide in retrospect that
the harm was foreseeable, then if there was an identifiable victim,
warnings will be necessary, but not always sufficient to avoid liability.
If there was no identifiable victim, but there was some potential for
custodial control, then the duty will take the form of a more diffuse
duty to protect. Finally, if there was an identifiable victim and the
therapist had the opportunity to exert custodial control, both the
broad duty to protect and the crystallized duty to warn apply. The
claim here is not that courts should apply the duties in this manner or
that all courts invariably will. Rather, the point is that a prudent clinician who wishes to avoid liability would be well advised to anticipate
liability under both the generalized and the crystallized duties according to the circumstances described.
On this account, the Tarasoff court and those that followed have
Patientor His Victim. The Therapist'sDilemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025, 1030
(1974)).

68. David Wexler has argued that therapists might fulfill the Tarasoff duty by employing interactional modes of therapy. D. WELER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW: MAJOR ISsUES 157-90 (1981). These cases did not directly address this possibility, but
to the extent that interactional therapy involving both the patient and the potential victim serves to make the potential victim aware of the danger from the patient, it requires the ability to identify the potential victim and it constitutes one
method of issuing a warning. If the therapist managed to engage the potential
victim in interactional therapy with the patient without revealing the feared danger, then there is no reason to think that the Tarasoff court would find that this
therapy was adequate to discharge the therapist's duty to protect the patient.
69. While the traditional professional negligence standard of ordinary care and competence under the circumstances involves a case by case retrospective evaluation
of the defendant's conduct, a crystallized duty identifies some relatively specific
criteria of due care that effectively establishes a rule of acceptable conduct. Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability, supra note 6, at 167-84.
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established a dual-level duty to protect the public from dangerous patients. First, the courts find a general duty to protect when they conclude the injury was foreseeable. The protective steps required to
satisfy this duty vary with the circumstances. Second, the duty to
warn constitutes a crystallized requirement to issue warnings when
the court finds the victim was identifiable and available to be warned.
Warnings constitute a necessary condition for preventing liability in
these cases in which the courts conclude the plaintiff was an identifiable victim, particularly in circumstances in which other preventive
methods such as custodial control were not available. While the early
cases that fell clearly in the ZOD category addressed the duty to protect through custodial control, several of the STIV cases actually addressed the identifiable victim issue (rather than the specific threat),
often in circumstances in which warnings were addressed separately
by virtue of the manner in which the courts structured their analyses
or because warnings were the only method available, or the only one
contested.70
Brady was a STIV case in which methods were not necessarily limited to warnings and in which the court emphasized the specific threat
aspect of the STIV formula. Schuster and Hamman rejected this approach on the grounds that the STIV would allow the therapist to
avoid liability for foreseeable harm merely because the patient did not
verbalize a threat. The Brady court did not, however, contend that the
STIV standard should be accepted as identifying those cases from
among the foreseeably harmful ones to which the duty to protect
would attach. Rather, the court adopted the standard as a criterion of
foreseeability for the purpose of triggering the duty. That is, the
Brady court, like the ZOD courts, accepted foreseeability as the foundation of the duty to protect, but it identified the STIV test as a measure of foreseeability. The Brady court does not, contrary to the
assertions of Schuster and Hamman, contend that liability for foreseeable harm ought to be limited to cases with specific threats. Rather, it
contends that harm is only foreseeable when there are specific threats
to identifiable victims; that is, it denies that there are cases in which
the harm is foreseeable absent specific threats.
At first glance, it may seem that any single case in which harm is
foreseeable absent a specific threat would serve as a counter-example
to this claim. The dispute is considerably more complex than that,
however, because the relevant conception of foreseeability embodies
both empirical hypotheses and policy considerations. It involves empirical hypotheses insofar as the claim that a particular type of harm is
foreseeable under certain conditions constitutes a claim about the correlation between those conditions and dangerous behavior. For exam70. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text regarding Thompson, Leedy, Wil-

liams, Peck and Sellers.
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ple, the Brady court's claim that specific threats provide an adequate
criteria of dangerousness for the purposes of triggering the duty to
protect implies a strong positive correlation between threats within
psychotherapy and harm, just as the Hamman court's claim that the
defendant knew of the propensity of "schizophrenic-psychotic" patients toward unexpected episodes of violence implies a strong positive
correlation between this diagnostic group and harmful behavior.71
Neither court provided any reason to believe these claims.
"Foreseeability" also embodies policy considerations, however, because even if we suppose these courts could provide some support for
their respective assertions, the correlations would certainly not be
perfect. Thus, the strength of association required to trigger the duty
would depend on the importance attributed to false positives and false
negatives, and on the likelihood of each. In short, whether a particular set of circumstances renders harm foreseeable depends upon the
correlation between those circumstances and dangerous behavior and
upon the reasons for preferring false positives or false negatives in
these conditions. These reasons will include such considerations as
the available preventive steps the therapist can take and the likely
positive or negative effects of taking those steps.
Each of these issues raises new empirical questions. To ask
whether harm is foreseeable under certain circumstances, therefore, is
actually to ask whether harm is sufficiently probable under these conditions to justify a particular available action in light of the possible
preventive effects, the potential adverse effects, and the probability of
each. There may be many cases, for example, in which harm is foreseeable for the purposes of directing careful therapeutic attention to
anger or of recommending voluntary hospitalization, although it is not
foreseeable for the purpose of seeking involuntary civil commitment.
The latter course of action requires a higher probability of harm because it entails a substantial loss of liberty, while the former involves
no comparable cost. Thus, one cannot measure or reliably estimate
foreseeability independent of the specific harm-prevention technique
contemplated. In order to determine whether harm was foreseeable
in a particular case, one must ask, for what purpose?
The Schuster court apparently lost sight of this action- relative conception of foreseeability when it reasoned that civil commitment and
warnings are two methods of fulfilling the broader duty to protect the
public, and thus, it analyzed these two issues together as questions of
negligence based on foreseeability.72 It also rejected the claim that
danger is not foreseeable by contending that such a position would undermine the traditional role of clinicians in civil commitment, and in71. Hanuman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 64, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (1989).
72. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 234, 257-60, 424 N.W.2d 159, 163-64, 173-75
(1988).
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deed the civil commitment statute itself, because the statute requires a
showing of dangerousness for commitment.7 3
The most obvious response to this argument is simply to say "so
much the worse for the statute." When a legal practice flies in the
face of empirical data, the reasonable response is to alter the practice,
not to ignore the information. 74 There is an alternative response,
however, that directly illustrates the point at hand.
The Wisconsin civil commitment statute cited by the Schuster
court requires, as a condition of commitment for dangerousness to
others, that the person to be committed has manifested this dangerousness "by evidence of recent homicidal or other violent behavior, or
by . . .a recent overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical
harm."75 The legislative counsel notes for that statute summarize Lessardv. Schmidt.76 The Lessard opinion specifically discusses the inadequacy of predictions of future dangerousness as grounds for
confinement and contends that in order to justify civil commitment,
the state must bear the burden of proving dangerousness through a
finding of a recent overt act, attempt or threat.77 By so requiring, the
Lessard court established criteria for the foreseeability of dangerousness for the purpose of civil commitment.
In summary, the Schuster court interpreted warnings and civil
commitment as comparable techniques for protecting the public from
foreseeable harm. In addition, it explicitly rejected the STIV standard
as inadequate and supported this decision partially on the basis of the
dangerousness requirement in the civil commitment statute. The civil
commitment statute in question, however, includes an "overt act, attempt or threat" provision which, like the STIV standard, defines dangerousness in terms of specific behavioral criteria. It seems, therefore,
that the Wisconsin civil commitment statute cited by the Schuster
court as evidence for rejecting the STIV standard actually embodies a
requirement very similar to the STIV test as a measure of foreseeability for the purpose of confinement.
The Lessard court defined this standard of foreseeability for the
purpose of civil commitment in light of the severe infringement of liberty caused by false positives. Some might plausibly argue that the
duty to warn does not produce the same type and severity of incursion
into individual liberty and thus, the duties to warn and to initiate con73. Id. at 246-48, 424 N.W.2d at 169-70.
74. Schopp & Quattrocchi, Tarasoff,the Doctrine of Special Relationships, and the
Psychotherapist'sDuty to Warn, 12 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 13, 27-28 (1984).
75. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 246 n.6, 424 N.W.2d 159, 169 n.6 (1988);
Wisc. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(1)(a)(2)(b)(West 1987). The emergency detention provision contains the same requirement. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 51.15(1)(a)(2)(West
1987).
76. Lessard v. Scbxnidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
77. Id at 1093.
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finement are not actually quite so similar as the Schuster court suggests. The point here, however, is that foreseeability of dangerousness
for any particular purpose requires analysis of the potential effects of
the action taken in response to both accurate and inaccurate predictions of harm. When the probability of inaccurate assessment is relatively high and errors are costly, behavioral criteria of foreseeability,
such as the STIV standard adopted by the Brady court or the "overt
act" requirement of the Wisconsin civil commitment statute, constitute plausible alternatives. In order to determine whether any proposed behavioral criterion provides the optimal standard, one must
evaluate both the significance of false positives and negatives and the
likelihood of each with this criterion and with the available alternatives. Thus, one cannot legitimately reject the STIV standard in favor
of foreseeability; rather, one must evaluate it as a proposed criterion of
foreseeability for the purpose of deciding whether the therapist
should have determined that the patient was dangerous enough to justify warning or other harm-preventive steps.
B.

Determined or Should Have Determined

Hamman, like Tarasoff, held that the duty to protect attaches
when the therapist determines or should determine the patient poses
a serious threat to others. 78 Schuster held the therapist is liable for
foreseeable danger. 79 To say that the danger was foreseeable to a
therapist who practiced to the standards of competence and care in the
profession is to say that a competent and careful therapist would have
identified the danger under these conditions and thus, that any therapist should have determined the patient was dangerous. In short, to
hold that a therapist who did not foresee harm is liable for the harm
done by the patient because the danger was foreseeable is just to hold
that the therapist should have determined the patient was dangerous.
Thus, the Tarasoff, Schuster, and Hamman courts endorsed a duty
that arises when the therapist should determine that the patient
presents a danger to others. The lack of any actual measure for this
ability to predict to the standards of the profession has been one factor
cited by advocates of relatively concrete criteria for the duty.SO While
the STIV test does not demonstrate any actual correlation between
threats and dangerousness, it does establish a standard by which both
courts and therapists can determine that the duty to protect attaches.
Therapists also have a duty to protect third parties when they actu78. Hamman v. County of Maricopa, 161 Ariz. 58, 64, 775 P.2d 1122, 1128 (1989); See
supra note 2 and accompanying text for the Tarasoff duty.
79. Schuster v. Altenberg, 144 Wis. 2d 223, 238, 424 N.W.2d 159, 165 (1988).
80. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,450-51,551 P.2d 334, 353-54,131
Cal. Rptr. 14, 33-34 (1976)(Mosk, J., concurring and dissenting); Brady v. Hopper,
570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983).
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ally determine their patients are dangerous. The Tarasoff court used
this prong of the duty to avoid dealing with the issue of professional
standards after it recognized that a body of research denied the existence of the capacity to predict that the duty was predicated upon. The
court did not refute or even challenge this data, but the majority reasoned the capacity to predict was not an issue in that case because the
therapist had predicted the danger.S1
This duty does not arise, however, when the therapist thinks, suspects, guesses, or dreams the patient is dangerous. Rather, it arises
when the therapist determines the patient poses a serious threat to the
public. To determine is not merely to form the opinion, expectation,
or suspicion. To determine is "[t]o conclude from reasoning, investigation, etc.... to ascertain definitely by observation, examination, calculation, etc." 82 To ascertain is "[t]o find out or learn for a certainty by
experiment, examination, or investigation."83 An investigation is "the
making of a search or inquiry; systematic examination; careful and
minute research."8 4 Reasoning is "the process by which one judgement is deduced from another or others which are given;" it is the
exercise of the capacity to reason or "to think in a connected, sensible,
or logical manner."85
Two central concepts underlie these terms. First, one who makes a
determination concludes or ascertains that some state of affairs obtains. That is, a determination involves certainty or finality in the
sense that the person who makes the determination regards this issue
as one that is settled or definite. Second, that settled conclusion is
drawn on the basis of some reliable, systematic belief-forming process
such as reasoning, investigation, observation, examination, or calculation. In order to determine that a proposition is true or that a state of
affairs obtains, therefore, one must derive a settled conclusion to that
effect on the basis of some rigorous, reliable belief-forming process.
In order to determine that one's patient is dangerous, one must do
more than just entertain the idea, one must do so on the basis of some
principled foundation that renders one's opinion settled and wellgrounded. Thus, the fact that in any particular case the therapist
thought of her patient as dangerous does not demonstrate that she determined the patient was dangerous. Contrary to the Tarasoff court's
claim, the fact that the therapist in that case thought the patient was
dangerous did not establish that the therapist determined the patient
was dangerous because there was no evidence that the therapist had
81. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 117 Cal. 3d 425, 436-38, 551 P.2d 334, 344-45,
131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 24-25 (1986).
82. I OXFORD ENGLISH DIcTIONARY 705 (compact ed. 1977).

83. Id- at 121 (the only current meaning).
84. Id at 1478.
85. II OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIoNARY 2432 (compact ed. 1977).
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any reliable foundation on which to ground this expectation at the
time he formed it.
Ironically, the Tarasoff court's reasoning by which it concluded the
therapist in that case had a duty to protect the victim provides a demonstration of exactly the kind of hindsight reasoning the court explicitly rejected. The court discounted arguments based on the evidence
supporting the claim that therapists are unable to predict dangerousness by asserting therapists would be held to the standards of prediction in the profession and that "proof, aided by hindsight . . . is
insufficient to establish negligence."8 6 The court also reasoned, however, that standards of prediction were not a problem in this case because the therapist "did in fact predict that Poddar would kill."87 The
court went on to discuss the duty therapists incur when they "in fact
determine, or under applicable professional standards reasonably
should have determined, that a patient poses a serious danger of vio88
lence to others."
In these passages, the court derived the proposition that the therapist determined the patient was dangerous from the proposition that
the therapist predicted the patient was dangerous. As indicated above,
however, to determine that some state of affairs obtains is to acquire
knowledge of that fact on the basis of some reliable belief-forming
process.8 9 The court had evidence to show the therapist had predicted
the patient was dangerous in the weak sense of "predict" in which that
term means only that one forms an expectation. In this weak sense of
the term, virtually anyone can predict virtually anything, and the fact
that an event has been predicted provides no good reason to expect it
to occur. Predictions in this sense do not entail determinations. How
did the court conclude the therapist had predicted dangerousness in
the stronger sense of the term that entails a reliable belief-forming
process and would enable him to accurately say he had determined his
patient was dangerous? 90 The court cited absolutely no evidence to
support the claim that the therapist's prediction was the product of
rigorous processes that would qualify it as a determination. Rather,
the court concluded that the therapist determined the patient was
dangerous on the basis of the facts that the therapist predicted the
violence and that the violence actually occurred. In short, the court
relied on exactly the type of proof by hindsight that it explicitly
rejected.
86. Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 438, 551 P.2d 334, 345, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 25 (1976).
87. 1I at 438, 551 P.2d at 345, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 25.
88. Id
89. See supm notes 82-85 and accompanying text.
90. Schopp & Quattrocchi, supra note 74, at 29-31. The authors explicate the equivocation among three different senses of the word "predict" that has complicated
the literature regarding the duty to warn.

1991]

PSYCHOTHERAPIST'S DUTY

This Article assumes for the sake of argument that therapists have
some duty to protect others from harm by their patients. Hence, the
purpose of this analysis of the Tarasoffcourt's reasoning is not to argue the court failed to ground that duty, but to demonstrate that the
"determined" disjunct of the disjunctive duty to protect retains the
same problem as the "should have determined" disjunct. That is, both
ground liability in foreseeability, but neither provides any guidance
regarding the appropriate criteria of foreseeability for the purpose of
establishing either level of the dual-level duty to protect.
The Brady court adopted the STIV standard in an attempt to identify some workable criterion of foreseeability. 91 Several other STIV
cases emphasized the requirement of an identifiable victim in circumstances that raised the issue of warnings, but the Brady court applied
the STIV to the broader duty to protect.9 2 These courts may or may
not have selected appropriate criteria of foreseeability for their purposes. This matter cannot be effectively settled by asserting that these
tests preclude liability for foreseeable harm, however, because these
standards constitute proposed criteria of foreseeability for these purposes. In order to justify accepting or rejecting them, one must evaluate the available empirical evidence regarding the correlation between
threats to identifiable victims and actual violence as well as the available evidence regarding the relative efficacy of various protective techniques. Finally, one must consider the probability and likely effect of
false positives and false negatives. Only this type of analysis can justify accepting or rejecting the STIV as an appropriate criterion of foreseeability for the purpose of issuing warnings or taking other
protective steps.
On this interpretation, the Schuster and Hamman courts have misconstrued the issue when they framed it as a dispute between those
who favor the ZOD test which holds therapists liable for foreseeable
harm and those who endorse the STIV standard which limits liability
to a certain subset of foreseeable harms- those that are preceded by a
specific threat to an identifiable victim. On the account presented
here, all parties agree that therapists are liable for foreseeable harm,
but they disagree about the appropriate measure of foreseeability
under at least some conditions. Advocates of the STIV standard want
a relatively clearly articulated test of foreseeability, while those who
endorse the ZOD standard prefer a traditional analysis of foreseeability on a case-by-case basis. Although Schuster and Hamman explained their rejection of Brady and the STIV test as a matter of legal
theory and policy analysis, the critical issue for selecting either the
STIV or the ZOD standard does not lie in these areas because all three
courts agreed that negligence liability arises primarily from foresee91. Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983).
92. See supra notes 26-49 and accompanying text.
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able harm. The pivotal issue for selecting the ZOD, the STIV, or some
third alternative involves evaluation of the implicit empirical
premises.
Advocates of the STIV standard emphasize the lack of professional
standards for foreseeability and argue that without the STIV, therapist liability is open-ended and unpredictable.93 In addition, the empirical data demonstrating pervasive hindsight bias in liability judgments
suggests that many courts, like the Tarasoff court, will allocate liability on the basis of the harmful results that followed a decision, rather
than on the basis of information that was available to the clinician at
the time the decision was made.94 Those who endorse the ZOD approach might respond that the uncertainty of case-by-case evaluations
and the danger of hindsight bias apply to all negligence determinations, and thus, there is no re.son to provide special relief for
therapists.95
Advocates of the STIV standard have at least three plausible rejoinders to this claim. First, they can contend that this argument actually supports a call for the broad adoption of specified criteria for
negligence. The claim that bias and unpredictability of liability are
widespread in the system does not justify this state of affairs, rather it
calls for broad reform. Second, they can claim that the problem is
particularly acute in cases addressing therapists' liability for harm to
third parties due to the acknowledged lack of standards for predictability. Third, they might argue that these dangers are particularly
problematic in cases of therapist liability for harm done by their patients because under certain circumstances, regulation of therapy
through negligence liability becomes fundamentally self-defeating.
The next section of this Article will examine this third response and
its ramifications for the tort regulation of psychotherapy in more
detail.
C.

The ZOD Standard as Self-Defeating

Psychotherapy is a fiduciary relationship in which therapists have
a legal duty to set aside their own interests and direct their conduct
within the therapeutic relationship solely for the benefit of the patient. 96 Tort regulation of fiduciary relationships such as the therapeutic one creates a pervasive tension. The fiduciaries are expected to
ignore their self-interest within the fiduciary relationship, but tort law
attempts to motivate people by appealing to their self-interest. That
is, negligence law attaches liability to unreasonably risky behavior in
93. E.g., Brady v. Hopper, 570 F. Supp. 1333, 1338 (D. Colo. 1983).
94. JurorHindsightBias,supra note 6, at 487-89. See supranotes 86-90 and accompanying text regarding the use of hindsight in the Tarasoff decision.
95. Id at 495.
96. Crystallized Standardsof Tort Liability,supra note 6, at 180.
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order to motivate people by appealing to their self-interest in avoiding
liability in such a manner as to prevent those people from engaging in
conduct that is risky to others. When the system works well, liability
for negligent behavior causes most actors' self-interest to converge
with the interests of others because they can protect their own liability-driven interests by avoiding conduct that is risky to others. For
most purposes, the fact that people's concern for the interests of
others is motivated by self-interest raises no problem.
The situation becomes more complex with fiduciary relationships,
however, because regulation of these relationships through negligence
law creates the following conceptual tension. Fiduciaries, including
psychotherapists, are required to conduct the fiduciary relationship in
a manner calculated to promote the beneficiary's interest. In order to
fulfill this fiduciary responsibility, clinicians must act solely for the
best interests of their patients, ignoring their own self-interest. Negligence law attempts to enforce the fiduciary duty by applying liability
rules that render therapists liable if they attend to their own interests
rather than to those of their patients. Thus, negligence law attempts
to motivate clinicians through appeal to their self-interest in a manner
that will prevent them from responding to appeals to their self-interest. In effect, courts issue directives in the form of liability rules that
instruct clinicians to ignore all considerations of the class that includes
these directives. In order to follow these directives, clinicians must
97
ignore them.
This conceptual tension creates the following practical dilemma.
(1) Negligence law appeals to clinicians' tort-driven interests in order
to protect and reinforce the fiduciary relationship by directing clinicians' attention toward their patients' interests and insuring that therapists' conduct their therapeutic relationships in a manner calculated
to promote those interests. (2) In any particular case, the clinician
either responds to this influence or she does not. (3) If she does not
respond to the legal threat of liability, then that threat does not protect or reinforce the fiduciary relationship. (4) If she does respond to
the prospect of liability, then negligence law has successfully directed
her attention to her own self-interest, actively undermining the attitude that the law is intended to promote. Therefore, the legal threat
of negligence liability either fails to protect and reinforce the fiduciary
relationship or it actively subverts it. In either case, attempts to legally reinforce the fiduciary therapeutic relationship through the
threat of tort liability carry inherently self-defeating force.98
This dilemma raises a complex set of issues regarding the tort reg97. ML at 181.
98. Id-
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ulation of psychotherapy that have been discussed elsewhere.9 9 For
the immediate purposes of this Article only the following points are
important. Under ordinary circumstances, this tension takes a benign
form because no apparent grounds for concern about tort liability
arise, and the therapists can pursue the therapeutic process for the
benefit of their patients without attending to issues of liability. In
these cases, sentence (3) applies in that tort law does not actively promote the fiduciary relationship, but that creates no problem because it
is not needed.
The dilemma becomes problematic, however, when some aspect of
the therapeutic process alerts therapists to the potential for tort liability, diverting their attention away from their fiduciary responsibilities
and toward their own tort-driven interests. In these cases, sentence
(4) applies in that potential tort liability actively undermines the fiduciary attitude. Certain combinations of legal rules and factual circumstances can create direct conflicts between therapists' tort-driven
interests and the interests of the patient or society. Specific rules of
negligence, including the crystallized duty to warn, can give rise to
such conflicts. If one of these crystallized duties attaches and the action required by the law conflicts with the patients' best interests,
then negligence law motivates therapists to abandon their fiduciary
duty to the patients in order to protect themselves from liability.
Under these circumstances, negligence law undermines the fiduciary
relationship it is designed to protect.100
Consider for example the duty to warn. If the argument presented
above is approximately correct, the prudent psychotherapist will interpret the Tarasoff duty to protect as including a crystallized duty to
warn when a probable victim is identifiable.101 It is a crystallized duty
to warn insofar as therapists who do not warn can expect to be held
liable for harm done by their patients even if they took alternative
steps to prevent harm. Thus, tort law will motivate prudent therapists
to issue warnings for the purpose of avoiding liability even if they
think that these warnings will undermine the patient's interests without preventing harm. In cases such as these, negligence law that is
intended to reinforce and protect the fiduciary relationship can actively undermine that relationship by establishing a crystallized duty
that can cause therapists' tort-driven interests to diverge from those of
the patient and of society.
A defender of the Tarasoff duty could respond by arguing that the
duty to warn represents a general rule intended to define the boundary at which society wants the therapist to abandon the fiduciary duty
99. See id for a more thorough explication of this tension and its general significance

for the regulation of psychotherapy through negligence law.
100. I& at 181-82.
101. See supra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
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in favor of protecting innocent third parties. This defender might accept the contention that certain cases will arise in which prudent therapists will protect themselves from liability through warnings that
serve neither the patient nor society, but on balance, the defender will
contend, this rule protects the public.
This claim about the effects of the rule in the long run may or may
not be correct. It is at bottom an empirical claim about the effects of
warnings on both the therapeutic project and the probability of harm.
Absent adequate data, the arguments on both sides remain speculative. Notice, however, that even if one accepts that the duty to protect
includes a crystallized duty to warn, this duty is crystallized in only
one sense. When harm is foreseeable, the therapist must warn, but
that in itself provides no reliable criterion for determining when the
duty attaches.
A fully crystallized standard of negligence contains two crystallized components. The crystallized duty identifies some specific action
the individual must take in order to discharge the duty of reasonable
care and avoid tort liability. A crystallized trigger identifies some specific event or set of circumstances that gives rise to the duty. Thus, a
fully crystallized standard of care requires that certain actors respond
to some previously identified precipitating events (the crystallized
trigger) by engaging in specified conduct (the crystallized duty).
When courts adopt the STIV standard for the duty to warn, they establish a fully crystallized standard of care, and when they adopt the
STIV for the general duty to protect, they establish a crystallized trigger for a broad general duty. Analogously, when courts adopt the
ZOD standard for the duty to protect, they crystallize neither the duty
nor the trigger, and when they apply the ZOD standard to the duty to
warn, they establish a crystallized duty without a crystallized trigger.
By applying the ZOD standard with case-by-case retrospective
analysis of foreseeability to the dual level Tarasoff duty, courts have
established a crystallized duty to warn without a crystallized trigger.
Arguably, this approach draws the worst from both worlds, undermining the fiduciary relationship in two different ways. First, the crystallized duty to warn creates the potential for situations where
therapists' tort-driven interests diverge from the interests of the patient and of society. This conflict arises when therapists encounter
circumstances in which they have good reason to believe that warnings will exacerbate the danger of harm or prevent them from applying other approaches that seem likely to benefit the patients and
decrease the probability of harm. In such cases, warnings will not protect the public interest, but they are likely to promote the therapists'
tort-driven interests.
A fully crystallized standard that requires well-defined action in
response to some specified trigger will motivate therapists to protect
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their interests by taking that action when that event occurs. Most
therapists can concentrate on their fiduciary responsibilities most of
the time, however, because they can wait for the specified trigger to
alert them of these threats to their self-interest. When a crystallized
duty lacks any specified triggering event that signals the attachment
of the duty, it also undermines the fiduciary relationship in a second
way, because it encourages prudent therapists to practice their professions with a wary eye toward potential liability rather than with full
attention on their patients' interests.
Both STIV and ZOD courts have accepted the broader underlying
duty to protect third parties. Thus, these cases share a common policy
analysis insofar as they accept the duty to protect the public as a limit
on therapists' duty to promote the interests of their patients. Therapists' tort-driven interests, however, can conflict with this duty just
as they can with the fiduciary duty to the patient. To the extent that
successful therapy might diffuse the patient's anger or direct the potentially dangerous patient toward less injurious conduct, a state of
affairs that undermines effective therapy also frustrates the policy
foundation for the duty to protect. A consistent body of research indicates that successful therapy depends heavily on a therapeutic relationship in which the patient perceives the therapist as concerned
about and dedicated to the patient's well-being.10 2 If the crystallized
duty to warn dilutes therapists' attention to their patients' well-being
by directing the therapists' attention and concern to their own tortdriven interests, then it might undermine successful therapy to the
detriment of both the patients and the public that needs protection
from dangerous patients.
Prudent therapists can reasonably be expected to maintain an
ongoing vigilance for any event that might later be interpreted as evidence of danger in response to which the therapists should have foreseen danger and issued a warning. If therapists respond to the duty in
this way, the duty to warn would dilute the fiduciary nature of the
therapeutic relationship in a much broader variety of circumstances
than a defender of the duty might expect or intend. The central point
here is that to the extent therapists are conscious of the threat of tort
liability, especially when it takes a form that they do not think they
can address through the careful and competent practice of therapy,
they can reasonably be expected to turn their attention from the interests of their patients and of society toward their own tort-driven interests. To the extent that this occurs, regulation of psychotherapy
through negligence law undermines its own purpose by diluting the
relationship that apparently constitutes an important factor in secur102. Crystallized Standards of Tort Liability,supra note 6, at 183.
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ing therapeutic results for the benefit of the patient and of the public
that needs protection from that patient.
The STIV standard can be understood as an attempt to limit this
self-defeating effect of tort-liability by providing a crystallized trigger
that clearly identifies cases in which the crystallized duty to warn applies. Recall that several of the STIV cases have directly addressed
the duty to warn rather than the more general duty to protect. If
therapists are concerned about protecting themselves from liability
for failing to warn, and if this concern dilutes their dedication to the
fiduciary relationship by encouraging them to direct a significant proportion of their attention and energy toward avoiding this liability,
then courts may be able to limit this undesirable effect by adopting
some relatively clear criteria for determining when the duty attaches.
Therapists could then put this concern aside until the triggering conditions occurred and issue warnings when the duty attached. In this
way, therapists could attend to their fiduciary responsibilities most of
the time, but sacrifice these concerns when the duty to warn demanded it. Court decisions applying the STIV test to the duty to warn
represent one plausible attempt to establish a fully crystallized standard of care.
The STIV standard contains two components. The identifiable victim element constitutes a necessary condition for issuing warnings to
the victim. Thus, if the court addresses a case in which warnings to
the victim seem to be the only available nontherapeutic harm-preventing method, it constitutes a necessary condition for any extra-therapeutic attempt to prevent harm. In many of these cases, the
identifiable victim requirement may provide a component in the criteria for application of the duty. If the patient clearly names or describes the object of his anger or intentions, then the therapist knows
that this aspect of the STIV standard is fulfilled.
The identifiable victim component does not provide an adequate
criteria of application, however, for two reasons. First, if the description of the victim is not clear, the therapist has no means of deciding
whether the court will decide in retrospect that the victim was identifiable. If therapists resolve this issue by concentrating therapeutic attention on identifying potential victims whenever they think there
might be any danger to anyone, they will again have redirected their
attention from the patients interests to their own tort-driven interests.
Perhaps the more serious deficiency in the identifiable victim criteria,
however, is that it tells the therapist who to warn, but not whether to
warn. Suppose, for example, that Jones verbalizes great anger at her
boss and reports fantasies about shooting him. By doing so, she might
provide an identifiable victim, but this indicates who the victim might
be if Jones engages in violence without telling the therapist whether
the probability of violence is sufficient to justify a warning. The spe-
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cific threat component of the STIV test provides a relatively clear an03
swer to the latter question.
On this interpretation, the STIV standard does not compete with
foreseeability as grounds for attaching the duty to protect. Rather, the
general duty to take reasonable action to protect third parties from
harm caused by one's patients arises on the basis of foreseeability, and
the therapist can fulfill that duty by taking any of several appropriate
steps including increased frequency of therapeutic contact, therapeutic efforts to diffuse anger or promote more adaptive responses to that
anger, change in therapeutic modality, etc. As long as these steps are
therapeutic ones, no conflict arises among the duty to protect third
parties, the fiduciary duty to the patient, and the therapist's tortdriven interests. The therapist can reasonably be expected, therefore,
to take such steps in response to even minimal indications of danger.
If the therapist fails to do so and harm results, then the ZOD standard
provides the usual and reasonable measure of liability.
The duty to warn, however, constitutes a crystallized duty within
the general duty to protect, and it can create a tension between therapists' tort-driven self-interest and either their fiduciary duty to their
patients, their duty to protect the public, or both. The STIV standard
represents one possible means of limiting the degree to which this tension undermines the fiduciary therapeutic project by establishing a
relatively clear criterion of application for this particular duty. A
crystallized trigger would allow therapists to pursue their therapeutic
responsibilities in an undiluted manner in most cases. When the criterion occurred, therapists could then alter their priorities, attending
first to protecting the public and secondly to promoting the patients'
interests. Ideally, this would maximize both patient services and public protection because the therapist would devote primary attention to
each task when it was most pressing. With this type of fully crystallized standard, the therapeutic project of the mental health system
and the public safety mission of the legal system would converge to
the degree that the crystallized duty and the trigger for its application
accurately represented the conduct most likely to signal dangerous situations and prevent harm.
In order to determine whether the STIV standard constitutes the
best available crystallized trigger for pursuing this goal, the legal system needs empirical evidence addressing a series of questions such as
the following. Do threats correlate more highly with violence than
alternative indicators such as diagnosis, verbalizations of violent fantasies, deterioration in reality testing, etc.? Do warnings decrease or increase the probability of harm more or less than alternative
103. The STIV criteria is only relatively clear because in some cases it may be difficult
to determine what constitutes a threat.
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techniques? Do warnings affect the opportunity to apply these alternative approaches? How do therapists adjust their practice in respose to legal rules such as the STIV or ZOD standards?
Absent fully adequate data regarding these issues, courts will have
to decide cases and establish legal rules on the basis of less satisfactory
information including professional testimony, available data regarding
related issues, the facts in previous cases, or common sense and experience. At the very least, courts that recognize these decisions rest
upon pivotal empirical assertions may be more likely to seek and evaluate relevant evidence rather than attempting to justify their decisions by appeal to distinctions of legal theory that do not adequately
address the relevant issue. In addition, professional groups and organizations with the expertise needed to acquire relevant data may be
more likely to do so if they realize that these cases actually turn on
empirical premises. Such data might prove helpful not only to the determination of the proper legal standard for tort liability, but also to
the therapeutic efforts of the therapists who encounter the problematic clinical circumstances and for addressing difficult issues involving
civil commitment.
Any civil commitment statute that includes dangerousness as a criteria for involuntary confinement requires that clinicians or courts estimate the probability that a particular individual will engage in
harmful behavior. Any data regarding either the incidence of dangerous conduct following particular indicators or the relative efficacy of
various responses to those indicators may enhance our ability to employ civil commitment when, but only when, it is the least restrictive
means of protecting innocent parties from harm.
V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The Tarasoff case explicitly recognized a duty on the part of psychotherapists to protect the public from harm caused by their patients.
That decision precipitated extended and heated controversy about the
justification, advisability, and contours of this duty to protect. Two
lines of cases have developed regarding the scope of this duty. The
STIV cases have held that the duty attaches only when there is a foreseeable danger to an identifiable victim, and the Thompson and Brady
courts have also required specific threats. The ZOD cases have held
that the duty applies whenever the patient creates a foreseeable danger and extends to all those within the zone of danger as determined
by a retrospective case-by-case evaluation.
The supreme courts of Wisconsin and Arizona have recently
handed down opinions in which they framed the issue as one of selecting either the ZOD standard or the alternative STIV as the appropriate test for the duty to protect third parties. Both courts rejected the
STIV in favor of the ZOD, construing the STIV as an illegitimate pre-
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clusion of liability for foreseeable harm merely because the patient
failed to verbalize a specific threat to an identifiable victim. The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly justified its reasoning as required by
the underlying theory of Wisconsin tort law which holds an actor liable for all foreseeable harm, and the Arizona Supreme Court appears
to have appealed implicitly to the same premise.
This Article contends that these courts have misconstrued the
question when they framed the issue as a choice between the ZOD and
the STIV as two competing standards for the same duty. As a result of
misconstruing the question in this manner, the courts have produced
an answer appealing to misguided arguments from the underlying
legal theory and have failed to recognize and address the empirical
premises that provide the conceptual links between that legal theory
and the appropriate roles of the ZOD and STIV standards.
The duty of psychotherapists to protect the public from dangerous
patients has actually developed into two separate types of duties.
First, the broad general duty to take reasonable steps to prevent harm
has developed out of the holding that the Tarasoff court articulated.
Second, the Tarasoff court and others have applied a crystallized duty
to warn identifiable potential victims. This Article argues that the
ZOD and STIV tests can be most clearly understood as two distinct
standards for these two separate duties. In some cases, therefore, both
the ZOD and the STIV might appropriately apply because both duties
might attach.
Contrary to the reasoning by the Wisconsin and Arizona Supreme
Courts, these two standards share a common foundation in legal theory and policy analysis. Both ground liability in foreseeability, and
both direct the therapist to give priority to protecting potential victims
rather than to the fiduciary duty to the patient when these two goals
conflict. The STIV standard represents a special application of the
principles underlying the ZOD, but most courts have applied it only to
the crystallized duty to warn. The putative justification for both this
duty to warn and the STIV standard rests on a series of unsubstantiated empirical premises. These premises include, for example, the
contentions that specific threats within psychotherapy are highly correlated with dangerous behavior, that warnings decrease rather than
increase the probability of harm, that warnings do not preclude the
opportunity to take potentially more effective protective steps, and
others.
The rational evaluation of the justifications for these duties and of
their applicable standards requires investigation into the evidence
available or acquirable to confirm or deny these premises. The appropriate evidence may range from formal research to testimony by professional witnesses, experience from prior cases, or ordinary commonsense observation. Honesty requires that anyone making these deci-
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sions evaluate all available evidence regarding these premises and that
the decision-makers recognize the nature of their choices as inferences
from incomplete evidence as opposed to conclusions of law drawn
from some independently adopted legal theory or normative policy
analysis. Inferences from incomplete information remain open to refutation or refinement through additional evidence.
A relatively large and consistent body of evidence supports the
contentions that psychotherapy has a positive effect and that the integrity of the therapeutic relationship makes an important contribution to this effect.10 4 This evidence supports at least a weak
presumption against legal rules that interfere with the therapeutic relationship. Courts should not adopt such rules, therefore, absent some
evidence supporting the contention that these rules protect more important social goals. Court opinions in the Tarasoff line of cases have
usually accepted the premise that they ought not interfere unnecessarily with the opportunity to secure effective mental health services.
They have also accepted, however, the contentions that the need to
protect the public overrides this value of therapeutic services and that
the duty to warn advances this more pressing purpose. They have appealed to no evidence supporting this last premise, however, apparently failing to realize that it is an empirical assertion rather than a
statement of policy priorities. These courts have provided no evidence, therefore, to override the presumption against undermining
the provision of services. Absent any evidence, courts should be hesitant to establish a crystallized duty, particularly one that lacks a specified trigger, for the reasons given in the body of this Article. 105
Courts, by virtue of their social roles, must come to some decision
in some timely manner. One cannot legitimately criticize them, therefore, for deciding on the basis of inadequate evidence when that is the
104. See supm note 102 and accompanying text.
105. In my opinion, the crystallized duty to warn somewhat increases the danger to
the public for two reasons. First, successful therapy can have a preventive effect
in that the therapist can direct angry or frightened patients away from injurious
conduct in some cases if they can maintain therapeutic contact. Some of these
patients, however, refuse to continue therapy when warnings are issued or refuse
to divulge matters that might precipitate such warnings. These effects are compounded by the dilution of therapists' focus on the therapeutic process in response to concern for their own tort-driven interests as discussed earlier. Second,
I have seen no reason to think that warnings to victims decrease the probability
of injury, while I have seen some evidence to suggest that such warnings increase
the probability of violent confrontation. When informed of threats and provided
with no reliable source of protection, some people conclude that preemptive attacks are reasonable responses.
This opinion reflects only my own clinical experience and that of others with
whom I have conferred. That experience may or may not be rppresentative of the
broader field. That, of course, is precisely the point insofar as it reflects the nature of the dispute as one that rests on unsubstantiated and often unstated empirical premises.
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only available information. If the members of professional groups affected by these decisions consider the opinions to be misguided or inadequately supported, it would be appropriate for them to pursue
research designed to secure additional evidence regarding the relevant
empirical premises. While controlled experimental inquiry into these
issues may be difficult, it seems plausible that one could gather survey
information regarding the incidence of threats in psychotherapy, the
results of warnings or alternative protective steps, the correlation between dangerous conduct and threats as opposed to proposed alternative indicators of dangerousness, etc. If successful, such research
might provide important information not only for legal determination
of tort liability, but also for improved therapeutic intervention in dangerous situations and more appropriate decisions regarding civil commitment. Thus, it would promote both legal and therapeutic aims.
Fully articulated judicial opinions often require integration of interdependent legal theory, policy analysis, and empirical premises.
Legal theory and policy analysis generate decisions about specific
cases when empirical premises provide the conceptual link between
the law and the facts. Similarly, the significance that a decision-maker
attaches to empirical data appropriately depends on that decisionmaker's understanding of the larger argument of theory and policy in
which it is advanced as evidence. If researchers do not provide rigorous data for the courts to consider, the courts must decide on admittedly unsatisfactory grounds. If researchers collect relevant data, but
courts fail to acknowledge its significance, then one can legitimately
criticize the judicial decision. The analysis advanced in this Article
suggests that courts ought to recognize that the current dispute is one
that turns heavily on empirical premises and, hence, that they cannot
settle it by appeal to legal theory or normative policy analysis alone.106
Rather, they should recognize the unsubstantiated empirical premises
that ground their analysis and consider any available evidence that
supports or undermines these claims.

106. The Schuster and Brady courts probably hold different theories of negligence derived from the Palsgrafdissent and majority respectively. These differences,
however, address the scope of the duty rather than the role of foreseeability in
raising a duty. A fully adequate analysis requires careful evaluation of both legal
theory and empirical premises.

